Abstract. We are deeply appreciative of the initiative of the editor, Marina Vanucci, in commissioning a discussion of our paper, and extremely grateful to all the discussants for their insightful and thought-provoking comments. We respond to the discussions in alphabetical order.
Calibration We are not sure what GMR mean by the expression "very loosely relates to a loss function." A proper scoring rule S(x, Q) is very strictly a loss function, where the state is the value x of X, and the decision is the quoted distribution Q for X. Moreover (see, for example, Dawid (1986) ), given an essentially arbitrary decision problem, with state-space X , decision space A, and loss function L(x, a), we can define S(x, Q) := L(x, a Q ), where a Q denotes a Bayes act with respect to the distribution Q for X; and this is readily seen to be a proper scoring rule. That is, essentially every decision problem is equivalent to one based on a proper scoring rule. If you take some specified decision problem seriously, you should use the associated proper scoring rule. There is then no problem of calibration.
Dependence on parametrisation GMR are correct in noting that, if we apply a scoring rule after first transforming the state space, we will generally get a nonequivalent result (the log-score is essentially the only exception to this.) However, there will be a new scoring rule for the transformed problem that is equivalent to the original rule for the original problem; see Parry et al. (2012, Section 11) for how a homogeneous score such as that of Hyvärinen transforms. We cannot give any definitive guidance on how to choose an appropriate transformation, though Example 11.1 of the above-mentioned paper suggests that some consideration of boundary conditions may be relevant.
Dependence on dominating measure This is not the case: when constructing the Hyvärinen (or other homogeneous) score, the formula is to be applied to the density with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Arbitrariness There is indeed a very wide variety of homogeneous proper scoring rules, any one of which will achieve our aim of eliminating the problematic normalising constant. At this point we can do little more than reiterate what we said towards the end of Section 3 of our paper.
Consistency Whether or not a person, lay or otherwise, finds consistency a compelling desideratum is probably a very personal matter. We do find it so. In a related point, we do not see why, in their first paragraph, GMR dismiss the implications of our expansion (4) so uncritically. Indeed, the near identity of the red lines in the four subplots of their own Figure 2 , which correspond to very different prior variances, lends support to our conclusion, from (4), that "the dependence of the Bayes factor on the within-model prior specifications is typically negligible."
GMR correctly point out that there are continuous distributions, such as the Laplace distribution, to which we cannot apply the Hyvärinen (or other homogeneous) score. This point deserves further attention. But for discrete models there is a different class of homogeneous proper scoring rules that are appropriate and can be used to the same end of eliminating the normalising constant; see Dawid et al. (2012) .
GMR's simulation studies are interesting. In contrast to our own analysis, they appear to show consistency of model selection based on the multivariate version of the Hyvärinen score. We should not complain if our method behaves even better than expected, but we confess we find this puzzling. We must also take issue with their assertion that "the log proper scoring rule tends to infinity [approximately four times] more slowly than the Bayes factor or than the likelihood ratio." It is simply not appropriate to compare absolute values across different scoring rules, since each can be rescaled by an arbitrary positive factor without any consequence for model comparison.
GMR point to the alternative approach of Kamary et al. (2014) . However, it seems to us that the part of that paper that relates to handling improper priors could just as readily be applied directly to the Bayes factor. For example, if we are comparing two location models, we might use the identical improper prior (with the identical value for its arbitrary scale factor) for the location parameter in both. Then this scale factor will cancel out in the Bayes factor, so leading to an unambiguous answer. But in any case, this approach is not available unless there are parameters in common between all the models being compared. Our own approach has no such constraint.
Hans and Perrugia
Christopher Hans and Mario Perrugia (HP) only consider "models" without any unknown parameters, so do not directly address our main concern, which was to devise methods for comparing parametric models having possibly improper prior distributions.
They focus on two main issues:
1. Comparisons between the Hyvärinen score and the log-score.
Robustness to outliers.
With regard to point 1, HP consider in particular cases where the two scores are linearly related. While we fail to see why this property should be of any fundamental importance (and will pass up their invitation to characterise it), it is worthy of some attention. We do note, however, that, in their analysis of a general covariance stationary Gaussian process, HP err when they say "σ 2 Pi and σ 2 Qi are constant in i." Recall that σ 2 Pi is not the unconditional variance of X i under P , but its conditional variance, given (X 1 , . . . , X i−1 ). Their asserted constancy property will hold for an AR(p) process only for i > p; while for a general process it will fail, although a limiting value will typically exist.
HP's specific applications do have this constancy property (at least for i > 1). In the case they consider of different means and equal variances, the Hyvärinen incremental delta score is just a constant multiple of that for the log-score, and this property extends to the cumulative scores. Since an overall positive scale factor is irrelevant, the two scores are essentially equivalent in this case.
For the other case HP consider, of equal means and different variances, even after rescaling the incremental delta scores will differ by an additive constant, c say. The cumulative scores, to time n, will thus differ by nc, which tends to infinity-an effect that might seem to jeopardise the consistency analysis in our paper. However, the following analysis shows that this is not so. Using HP's formulae, and setting ξ = τ 2 P /τ 2 Q , consider first the log-score. The incremental delta log-scores are, under P , independent and identically distributed, with expectation 1 2 (ξ − 1 − log ξ) > 0 and finite variance, so that the difference between the cumulative prequential score for Q and that for P tends to infinity almost surely-so favouring the true model P . Likewise Q will be favoured when it is true. Now consider the Hyvärinen score. Again the incremental delta logscores under P are independent and identically distributed with finite variance, now with expectation τ −2 q (ξ + ξ −1 − 2) > 0; so once again, the true model is consistently favoured.
HP ask whether there is any principled reason for applying the cut-off value 0 to the difference in prequential scores. Well, it seems natural to us to choose the model whose predictions have performed best so far, so indicating that this might continue into the future-although, as the advertisers of financial products are obliged to point out, past success cannot be taken as an infallible guide to future performance. We further note the essential equivalence of this recipe to the machine learning technique of "empirical risk minimisation" in Statistical Learning Theory, which has developed an extensive theory, extending well beyond the case of parametric models, characterising when this will be effective; see ; for application to the general case of dependent sequential observations. In any case, should one wish to use a cut-off different from 0, there is no impediment to doing so-this would not affect the consistency properties we have investigated, which only rely on the difference of cumulative scores tending to infinity. How the choice of cut-off could relate to differential prior probabilities and utilities is a topic that deserves further consideration.
Turning to HP's point 2, their simulations appear to show that the Hyvärinen score is less robust to additive outliers than the log-score (though we note that in their example the outlier only affects 2 of the 100 summands of the overall score.) Issues of the robustness of minimum score inference have been considered by Dawid et al. (2015) , where it is shown that (in an estimation context) certain proper scoring rules do enjoy good robustness properties (generally better than straightforward likelihood). However, these do not include the Hyvärinen score or other homogeneous scores. Thus there may indeed be a conflict between the aim of our current paper, which is to overcome problems associated with improper distributions, and the very different aim of protecting against outliers.
Katzfuss and Bhattacharya
Matthias Katzfuss and Anirban Bhattacharya (KB) are particularly concerned with the question of whether our approach can be tweaked to yield a "pseudo-Bayes factor", where a general score takes the place of log-likelihood. While it would be very nice if this were so, we are a little dubious. As KB point out, there are serious problems related to the arbitrary scaling of a general score. These are compounded when, as for the homogenous cases we consider, the score is a dimensioned quantity. Thus if the basic observable X has the dimension of length, L, then the Hyvärinen score has dimension L −2 , so any scale factor, such as λ in their (1.1) or (3.1), would have to have dimension L 2 . Otherwise put, whether we are measuring X in nanometers or in parsecs will affect the absolute value of the score (though not the comparisons that form the basis of our method).
There is no reason why our method should not be used to compare a finite number of models, rather than just 2. However, when the number is countably infinite, or grows with sample size, even likelihood-based model selection can fail to be consistent. In that case the problem can sometimes be solved by regularisation, essentially equivalent to introducing prior probabilities over models and selecting on the basis of the posterior model probabilities. Perhaps some analogue of this device might work for more general proper scoring rules.
